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LYLE V. RICHARDS, 9 S. & R. 322
James Hamilton, claiming to own two undivided
thirds, and Andrew Hamilton to hold the other third, by
an attorney in fact, granted a tract of land to Samuel Richards, his heirs and assigns reserving a "rent-charge" to
them and their heirs of $280 per annum payable forever
half-yearly. Richard, sued in covenant for an instalment
of the rent, alleges that the conveyance of the land did not
vest in him a good estate in fee-simple.
The title of the grantors originated in a devise of a
great-uncle James Hamilton. The devise, after a series of
particular estates to a nephew William, and his sons, and
the male issue of these sons, none of which, save the life
estate to William took effect because of his death unmarried and without issue, was to Andrew Hamilton, elder
brother of William, for life with remainders to the first
and every other son of Andrew, for life, with remainders to
their issue in tail male, successively, remainder to the
heirs of the body of William (who has died without such
heirs) remainder to the heirs of the body of Andrew, remainder to the heirs of the testator. Andrew died before
his brother William, leaving two sons, James the elder,
and Andrew, and four daughters. These sons survived
William, their uncle. When by the death of William without issue, the devises to his issue had became incapable of
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taking effect, James, son of Andrew, conceived the purpose of suffering a common recovery, with a view to turning into a fee simple, the estate which he had. He first
executed a deed, March 5, 1814, to lead the uses of the recovery he was about to suffer, to Thomas Parke in fee,
therein covenanting that James Lyle should be the demandant, Thomas Parke, tenant to the praecipe, himself, James
Hamilton the first vouchee and Andrew Hamilton, the second vouchee, who should vouch the common vouchee, and
that the estate should be for the use of James Hamilton in
fee. At the March term, 1814 of the Supreme Court, in
the county of Philadelphia, a writ of entry was accordingly
issued by James Lyle, demandant, against Thomas Parke,
tenant, and a common recovery of the premises was suffered with treble voucher.
On April 5th, 1814, James Hamilton, thinking himself thus clothed with a fee, granted one undivided third
part of the premises to his brother Andrew and his heirs.
Two days after, James and Andrew constituted Thomas
Cadwalader their agent to make conveyances in groundrent, of parts of the premises; and on May 2d, 1814, Cadwalader conveyed a portion of the land to Richards, the defendant, his heirs and assigns, reserving the "rent charge"
of $280 payable annually forever.
What were the estates of James Hamilton and Andrew
Hamilton prior to the time of the recovery? Tilghman,
C. J., describes them thus: James had an estate for life;
with contingent remainders to his sons successively in tail
male (The previous statement of the case, shows that the
gift to the sons i. e. the first remainder, was for life, with
remainder to the heirs male of the body of such sons.
No reference is mide in the opinion to the rule in Shelley's
Case.) Andrew had a vested remainder for life, sequent
on the life estate of James and the remainder to the sons
of James, and Andrew's sons had contingent remainders
in fee. A remainder had been given to the heirs of the
body of Andrew, the nephew, after the estates in William.
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Andrew had died, and this remainder had passed to his
oldest son James. This remainder was vested. The ultimate remainder was to the testator's "own right heirs
forever." The nephew Andrew, was the oldest, and his
sons and daughters were, on the death of William and Andrew, the testator's right heirs. Tilghman, C. J., thinks
that James took the estate tail by descent from his father
Andrew, but says that it matters not whether he took it
by descent or purchase.
It is evident that the deed of James and Andrew, by
their agent, Cadwalader, did not pass a fee to Richards,
unless the common recovery had changed their estates.
James had had a life estate. There were contingent remainders. There was also a vested life estate in Andrew,
which was also followed by contingent remainders. While
their deed to Richards would have passed these vested
life estates, as well as the tail general vested in James, the
contingent remainders would have continued to exist.
Tilghman, C. J. mentions the question whether James'
life estate was merged in his estate tail general, in remainder, or in the fee simple sequent on the estate tail,
which was vested in him and in his brothers and sisters,
or whether this merger was prevented by the interposition
of the vested life estate in Andrew. He assumes, for the
occasion, that no merger had occurred.
What was the effect of the common recovery? Was
the recovery regular in form? No objection to its form
is made by Justice Gibson, who dissents in one respect,
from the opinions of the other two judges.
Tilghman,
C. J., observes: "The recovery was well suffered. Dr.
Parke was a good tenant to the praecipe, by virtue of the
conveyance to him from James Hamilton, and the said
James and his brother Andrew were regularly brought
into court as vouchees."
The common recovery being in orthodox form, what
was its effect on the estates of James and Andrew? The
,common recovery had long been used in England, to bar
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entailments. The judges in the present case, do not agree
whether in Pennsylvania independently of legislation it
was effectVal for this purpose. An act of assembly of
Jan. 27th, 1749-'50, entitled An Act for barring estates
tail, was as follows: Forasmuch as the entailing of estates
within this province without a provision by law for barring them, would introduce perpetuities, prevent the improvement of such estates, disable tenants in tail to make
provision for the younger branches of their families,
prove of general detriment to the province, and be attended with manifold inconveniences. For preventing whereof
for the future Be it enacted, That fines and common
recoveries heretofore levied and suffered within the province of Pennsylvania, or which shall at any time or times
hereafter be levied or suffered within the said province
duly and according to the common or statute laws of England, either in the Supreme Court of Judicature within the
said province, or in any of the county courts for holding of
pleas within the said province respectively, in which the
houses, lands, tenements or hereditaments entailed do or
shall lay, shall be and hereby are declared to be of like force
and effect, to all intents, constructions and purposes, for
barring estates so entailed, as fines and common recoveries, by the laws of England aforesaid, there levied or suffered, of lands, tenements and estates entailed within the
realm, are received, declared or enacted to be." Tilghman, C. J. and Duncan, J., discovered in this statute only
a recognition of a pre-existing law, while Gibson, J., infers
from it, that although there had been a few common recoveries before its enactment, their effectiveness to bar entails
was at least disputable.
James Hamilton had a life estate and a vested penultimate remainder in fee tail. By the common recovery,
this fee tail was transformed into a fee simple.
His life estate was separated from this fee by
intervening contingent remainders.
If the life estate was not destroyed by forfeiture, in conse-

Dickinson Law Review
quence of the recovery (some authorities hold that
the life tenant, having a remainder in fee tail may rightly
suffer a recovery) it was destroyed by merger in the fee
simple. The remainders to his several sons being still contingent, since he had no sons at the time, were destroyed
likewise, because there was no longer any particular estate
to support then. Tilghman, C. J., adverts to the fact that
when the case was before the court, the life estate of
James, had it not perished by the recovery, had ceased by
the death of James without issue in July, 1817, three years
after the making of the conveyance to Richards. All the
remainders to the sons of James had been destroyed by
the recovery.
The next question is, what effect had the recovery upon the estates of Andrew and his sons? Andrew is still
alive, and he may have sons to survive him. If their contingent remainders still exist, Richards has not a perfect
title in fee to the land. If Andrew's life estate ceased in
consequence of the recovery, the remainders to his sons,
who were as yet unborn, being contingent, likewise perished. Nothing is suggested to have destroyed this life estate, other than the ,participation of Andrew in the recovery as second vouchee. The question is, says Gibson, J.,
"whether his joining in the covenants in the deed to lead
the uses and suffering himself to be vouched without
counter-pleading the warranty and 5vouching over the
common vouchee, destroys the estate in favor of James,
under the deed to lead the uses, and I have no doubt that
It is thereforq unnecessary to inquire
it does. * * *
whether Andrew's estate passed by surrender, release or
in any other manner. It was clearly extinguished by his
warranty, which estops him from ever claiming it, for
all are estopped by a recovery, who cannot falsify it,
whether they come in as vouchees or were originally parties." Gibson, J., has not used the word forfeited, to
describe the process of extinction of Andrew's life-estate.
Tilghman, C. J., says that it was lost by a "disclaimer on
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record ;" that, since Andrew joined in the recovery "there
cannot be a doubt that his life-estate was forfeited." "He
disclaimed the title under which he held his life-estate,
and set up another, adverse to it, which he warranted.
What more coild he do? In what manner could he more
forcibly and efficaciously destroy the title under which
he held, than by his disclaimer and warranty on record?"
"Whether," says Tilghman, C. J., "the life estate of Andrew Hamilton was extinguished by forfeiture, or otherwise, is immaterial. And I have no doubt that in 'some
way, either by his own conveyance and warranty on record, or by estoppel, if not by forfeiture it was extinguished." P. 329. Hence the conclusion is reached "the life
estate of Andrew Hamilton being extinguished the contingent remainders dependent on it were without support
and fell to the ground, and the general estate tail with
the fee simple in remainder after it having been barred
by the recovery the estate in fee simple which was vested
in James Hamilton by the said recovery became indefeasible, and the title conveyed to the defendant by James
and Andrew Hamilton was good."
Having reached this conclusion, further discussion
became irrelevant. There had however been a difference
of opinion, six years before' between Tilghman and Gibson 2 in regard to the effect of a common recovery suffered by a life-tenant.
The Englisli doctrine, that the life
estate was destroyed by forfeiture, was supported by the
former, but repudiated by the latter. "Unless," said the
latter, I find myself bound by a series of decisions, establishing the doctrine as the law of this state, I shall not
accede to it." He convinced himself that this series was
missing. Not denying the power of a life-tenant by forfeiture, merger, etc., to destroy his life estate, although
its destruction involves that of remainders thereon which
'Dunwoodie v. Reed, 3 S. & R. 435.
2Duncan the third member of the court, having been of counsel in the cause, gave no opinion.
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are contingent, he objects to saying that a common recovery shall be a mode by which a life estate may be
forfeited.
Tilghman, C. J., consumes over six pages in showing
that the common recovery was not unsuitable to Pennsylvania, that it had been used to bar entails before the
act of Jan. 27th, 1749-50, that the recovery had not been
confined to the barring of entails, but had been, employed
by life-tenants to convey fees with the effect of destroying the life estates and contingent remainders thereupon,
and the purpose of the act was not to exclude the use of
recoveries in cases in which they had been theretofore used
in England and this province or state. "It cannot be
denied," says the Chief Justice "that the suffering of a
common recovery by tenant for life, works a forfeiture
of his estate by the common law, and consequently destroys
all remainders, which, at the moment of forfeiture, rest
ill contingency. It lies then upon those who deny the
existence of the law of forfeiture in Pennsylvania, to
prove it." He concludes that "the common law doctrine of forfeiture, for the purpose of barring contingent
remainders, is congenial to the spirit of our constitution
and therefore, in principle, it ought to be extended as in
fact it has been extended to the state of Pennsylvania."
In an opinion covering 24 pages, Duncan, J., substantially concurs in the views of Tilghman, C. J.
In an opinion over 15 pages in length, after agreeing
with the other justices that Andrew's life estate was
destroyed by his participation in the common recovery
and that the contingent remainders sequent upon it were
lost, Judge Gibson argues that the only function of the
common recovery in this state is to bar entails; that the
act of Jan. 27th, 1749-50, recognizes it as valid only for
'In Waddell v. Rattew, 5 R. 231 (1835) it was decided that a
common recovery suffered by a life-tenant destroyed the life-estate
and contingent remainders.
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this purpose; that from sundry facts it may be inferred
that the colonists "must have had a perfect horror of
common recoveries with their vouchers to warranty, their
recompense in value, their conveyances to make a tenant
to the praecipe, their deeds to lead or declare uses, etc."
He expresses the belief that recoveries were "newly
introduced
by the
act
of 1750,
despite
the evidence of prior instances of it, and that that statute
allows them only for the purpose of barring entails. (Yet
he has united with the court in deciding that when Andrew became second vouchee, he did an act which destroyed his life estate and the contingent remainders following it.)
Judge Gibson objects to the recognition of the doctrine of forfeiture by a life tenant of his life estate by
the suffering of a common recovery because of its "palpable injustice," p. 347. In Dunwoodie v. Reed,4 he had
said "It is monstrous that the tenant of the particular estate should be permitted by his own act, to defeat the intention of the grantor in any case where the execution of
that intention is not inimical to public policy; and it1 is
still more monstrous that he should be punished through
the sides of the innocent contingent remainder man."
Yet in the case before us he agrees that Andrew, by joining as second vouchee in the common recovery, has destroyed, not his life-estate only, but all the contingent
remainders following it. How can it matter whether we
call the process a forfeiture or, as he prefers, a surrender,
release, estoppel, a barring. Andrew's estate was barred, he remarks; and if so, James' life-estate was no longer
parted from the remainder in fee, by a vested life estate.
James' life-estate was then merged in the fee. Hence
"the contingent remainders limited to the sons of Andrew
are gone." p. 337.
If there is injustice to contingent remaindermen, by
43 S. & R., 435, 453.
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allowing the owner of a prior particular estate to extinguish the remainder, it is occasioned by the enforcement
of the principle that the destruction of the particular estate while the remainder is contingent, destroys that remainder. We do not however perceive that Justice Gibson has any quarrel with that principle. He objects only
to allowing the destruction of the remainder, in consequence of the destruction of the particular estate by what
is termed forfeiture. That estate may be ended by various acts of its owners, and no fault is found with the
superinduction thereby of the extinction of the remainders. But it is "monstrous" to allow the remainder to
be eliminated by the "forfeiture" of the anterior estate.
How wonderfully acute the sense of justice which distinguishes between these various acts of the particular tenant, which eventuate in the despoiling of innocent parties, a sense which approves of mergers, of estoppels,
but which brands as iniquitous, feoffments, fines, common
recoveries resorted to to exalt life estates into fees.
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LANCASTER v. DOLAN, 1 RAWLE 231
This was an ejectment brought in the Supreme Court.
Edward Rogers and Tacy, his wife, in 1820, executed a
bond and a mortgage upon the premises to Lancaster for
$3000. The mortgage was attested by two credible witnesses. This bond and mortgage were assigned to Ross
who foreclosed the mortgage, and caused a sheriff's sale
of the premises to Lancaster. Rogers and wife were in
possession of the premises through tenants, and Lancaster
instituted this action against these tenants, Dolan and
others.
Tacy Rogers, who before her marriage was Tacy
Prior, owned in 1811, an undivided half of a piece of land.
She, in that year, gratuitously conveyed an undivided half
of this half to McPherson in trust for her mother, Mary
Berrien, for life. In 1815 Tacy Prior and Mary Berrien
conveyed the land to trustees. (Why Mary Berrien and
not her trustee, united in this conveyance, is not disclosed). The trustees were to hold a moiety of the land conveyed for the use of Mary Berrien, during her natural life.
They were to hold the other moiety during Mrs. Berrien's
life and after her death, both moieties of the undivided
half, for the use of Tacy Prior "and in case the said Tacy
should marry then the same to be held to and for the only
and personal benefit of the said Tacy, whether she be
covert or sole, free from all interference, claim or control
of her husband or other person whatsoever." After her
death, the trustees were to hold the land for the use of
such persons, for such uses and benefits and for such term
or estate as she, in her lifetime, whether married or single,
should "designate, order or direct by any writing, either
purporting to be her last will and testament, or other writing whatsoever, executed under her hand and seal in the
presence of at least two credible witnesses." If no such
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will or other writing was made, the trustees were to hold
the land for the sole use and behoof of such issue as the
said Tacy may leave, equally to be divided between them
in fee simple. If Tacy left no issue, the premises were to
be held for the use of her brothers and sisters, without
distinction between whole and half blood. If there was no
issue, and no brothers or sisters, the land was to be held
for the use of her heirs on the part of her mother. A
power of sale was given to the trustees with the consent of
the grantors. A witness testified that he had collected
the rents of the moiety of the land and paid one-half thereof to Mrs. Berrien and the other half to Tacy Prior before
her marriage, and to her or her husband, since her marriage. The deed of trust was recorded in 1815, a month
after its execution. The mortgage executed in 1820, was
upon the entire half, which was conveyed in 1815 to the
trustees, making no exception of the half of that half
which belonged in equity to Mrs. Berrien.
The first question considered by the court, respects
the enforceableness of the title acquired under the mortgage against the estate of Mr3.Berrien. The statute of
27th Elizabeth made every conveyance made for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving such persons as afterwards for money or other good consideration purchased
the land utterly void, frustrate and of none effect." Some
English decisions had held that every voluntary conveyance was to be held to have been made for the purpose of
defrauding, and to be void, as respects sibsequent purchasers for value. Had this interpretation of the statute
been established prior to the revolution, says Gibson, C. J.,
he would "submit to it on the ground of authority." He
compares the decisions pro and con. The consideration
that influenced English judges to put the interpretation
which made the statute annul voluntary conveyances does
not operate here. There, in the absence of a system of
registration of deeds, voluntary conveyances might in a
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large number of cases, be used with a fraudulent purpose.
Here, such deeds are like others, recorded.
The subsequent purchaser has notice of the prior conveyance. It
would be a fraud in him to assist his grantor to defeat
the earlier conveyance, although it was gratuitous. "The
pretended equity of a subsequent purchaser with notice,
even as against a volunteer would spring from an act,
the consequence and design of which would be to enable
the donor to cheat the donee. The purchase would be an
act of collusion and all the fraud would be on the side of
the purchaser."
The deed of trust for Mrs. Berrien was not of record, but her deed and that of Tacy Prior were on record,
and they showed the interest of Mrs. Berrien.
Since the question whether a voluntary conveyance
is to a later purchaser for value, fraudulent and void is
in Pennsylvania res integra, we are at liberty, says Gibon, C. J., to interpret the statute according to the dictates
of justice and conscience."
Even if interpreted in the
English mode its construction must bend to our statutes.
A mortgagee, concedes the Chief Justice, is a purchaser; and if he were not, one who buys at a foreclosure
sale is. Lancaster then would be protected by the statute
of Elizabeth, if it bore the interpretation of some of the
English judges, but, that. interpretation being rejected,
Mrs. Berrien is unaffected by the Rogers mortgage. There
can be no recovery of the half of the half in which she
had an equitable interest. She was no party to the mortgage.
The deed of Mrs. Berrien and Tacy Prior created an
equitable estate in the latter for her life. Although she
was not married, and there is no evidence that she was
at the making of the deed in contemplation of marriage,
a sole and separate use is assumed to have been created.
Later decisions have held that the feme must either be
married or in contemplation of marriage, in order that a
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valid sole and separate use should arise. 22 P. and L.
Dig. Decisions, 38,530. The chief justice remarks of a conveyance like the one in question "to permit her (Tacy
Prior) to use, improve, occupy, possess and enjoy and to
receive all and singular the rents, issues and profits,"
would create a use that would be executed, if limited "to
any other than a married woman or feme in contemplation of marriage."
Perhaps then, the unreported evidence showed that Tacy Prior was, when she made the
conveyance contemplating marriage.
Did she have power to mortgage her equitable lifeestate?
Adverting to vacillation in the English decisions, the Chief Justice remarks that there is no case
in which she ha been permitted to lay her hands on the
inheritance.
But, he argues, if her power of disposal
"does not comprehend the fee when she is the owner of
it, it is not easy to understand how it can comprehend a
less estate." From the declaration in the deed that the
trust is "for the personal support and comfort of the said
Tacy," he infers that the land was intended to be inalienable by her.
He concludes that a married woman has
no power to dispose of her estate held to her sole and
separate use, unless it be "expressly given."
As no
power to dispose of the life estate was given in the deed
creating it, she did not possess it. The purchaser under
the mortgage, then, acquired no right to the land, during her lifetime.
Mrs. Rogers had died since the trial at nisi prius and
before the filing of the decision. Hence, says Gibson, C. J.,
the question of the power of a feme over land held to her
sole and separate use, "involves no more at present, than
the costs of the action." As the plaintiff was not entitled
to the possession when he brought the action, he is liable
for the costs.
The purchaser at the mortgage sale acquired, therefore, right to the possession neither of the half of the
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moiety belonging to Mrs. Berrien, during her life, nor of
The
any portion, during the life of Mrs. Rogers.
death of Mrs. Rogers has left the question of the ownership of the remainder, after her life estate. In that she
had no estate, but she had a power to dispose of it by
will, or any other writing under her hand and seal, exeThe
cuted in the presence of two credible witnesses.
trustees were to hold it for the use of such persons as she
should designate, order and direct. Could Mrs. Rogers
execute this power for her own benefit? The Chief Justice says "the use, as to the remainder of the estate was
executed by the statute; consequently the power being
general, was intended to be exclusively for her benefit."
This is not intelligible. As to the remainder, after the
life estate, the trust was for appointees, if any; if none,
for issue, if any; if no issue, for brothers and sisters, if
any; if none, for the heirs. It is idle to talk of an execution of the use as to the remainder, when it is thus limited. The exercise of the power was necessary before the
use could be executed in the appointees. That the power
was general, is manifest. That for that reason, it may
be executed exclusively for her benefit is manifest. Execution of the use has no relevancy. Mrs. Rogers could
appoint it to a vendee, taking the purchase money. She
could appoint it to a mortgagee, taking the money loaned.
Was the mortgage a designation, order or direction
of the person to whose use the trustees should hold the
estate? The word "sell" is not in the definition of the
power in the deed to the trustees. "The power to sell
implies a power to mortgage, a mortgage being a conditional sale," says the writer of the opinion, as if sale had
been mentioned in the deed.
But, was the mortgage made in execution of the
power? The power is not recited in it. The mortgage
was doubtless intended to embrace the entire interest of
Mrs. Rogers. But it is as to that a nullity. It will be al-
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together a nullity unless it acts on the remainder. Hence,
argues the Chief Justice, it must have been intended to
be an exercise of the power over the remainder, although
it contains no reference to the power.
As the judgment was for the defendant, because, at
the institution of the suit the plaintiff was not entitled
to the possession of any portion of the premises, it is clear
that so much of the opinion of the Chief Justice as deals
with the validity of the mortgage as an appointment of
the remainder, after the death of Mrs. Rogers, is dictum.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. RETTEW
Homicide-Indictment of Constructive Principal as Accessory Before the Fact-Admissibility of Record of Principal's Conviction
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prosecution for being accessory before the fact to the murder of X. It was shown that Sanderson was tried and found guilty
of the murder of X, and was sentenced to be electrocuted. Evidence
was offered of this conviction by the record. It was proved that
Rettew was aiding the crime. A burglary was attempted and while
Sanderson was to do the breaking and entering, Rettew was to
keep watch and give an alarm should any officer appear. After
affecting an entrance, Sanderson, in overcoming the resistance of X,
who was in the building and endeavored to prevent the theft which
was the object of the burglary, killed X.
Howard, for the Commonwealth.
Turek, for the appellant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BRUNER, J. Under the Pennsylvania statute of March 31,
1860, P. L. 440, in all cases of felony the accessory is punishable
in the same manner precisely as the principal; and may be charged
in the indictment with having actually committed the offense as
principal in the first degree, or he may be indicted for a substantive felony, or he may be indicted as accessory with the principal,
at the option of the prosecutor. Brandt v. Comm., 94 Pa. 290;
Comm. v. Bradley, 16 Sup. 561.
This act has abolished the technical distinction between accessories before the fact and principal offenders. A person may be
convicted on an indictment formally charging him as an accessory
before the fact in the felony, although the evidence shows that he
was present when the principal fired the shots. Comm. v. Bradley,
16 Sup. 561.
It is sometimes said that to constitute a man an accessory, it
is necessary that he be absent at the time when the felony was
committed. "Yet, by separate acts, a man may make himself both
principal and accessory in the same felony." 1 Bishop's Crim.
Where several join to commit a crime, and one
Law, sec. 664.
keeps watch while the others commit the crime, the one who
watches is responsible as a principal. 12 Cyc. 187. The defend-
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ant here, Rettew was, it is plainly evident, an accessory before the
fact. He was also a principal, having been constructively present
when the crime was committed. After a careful examination of the
evidence as it has come to us, we cannot say that a jury would
not be warranted in convicting the defendant on the accessory
charge even if he had not been present at the very moment when
the killing was committed by Sanderson.
In order to prove the guilt of Sanderson, the prosecutor offered the record of his conviction. This was in accord with the
well-established rule that upon the trial of the accessory the guilt
of the principal must be established. In Buck v. Comm., 107
Pa. 486, the rule was said to be that the proper method of proving a conviction for crime is the production of the record.
But
this decision was later modified in Comm. v. Racco, 225 Pa. 113,
where the court held, that any evidence competent to prove the
guilt of the principal is admissible for that purpose if not introduced
for the purpose of showing the connection of the accessory with
the offence.
The Supreme court, in Comm. v. Minnich, 250 Pa. 363, states
the rule to be, that in a separate trial of one charged as an accessory, the same burden rests on the Commonwealth to establish
the guilt of the principal as would ha e rested upon it were the
principal himself being tried, and the same measure of proof
is required in one case as in the other. The record of the conviction of the principal while not conclusive with respect to the
fact of the principal's guilt, is allowed exceptional weght as matter
of evidence in that standing alone and unexplained it is sufficient
to warrant the conclusion in support of which it was introduced.
The decision in the case at bar must turn upon the question,
What is a sufficient record to prove the guilt of the principal?
A like question arose in two late cases of our own Supreme court.
Comm. v. Minnich, 250 Pa. 363; Comm. v. Vitale, 250 Pa. 548. In
these cases the record as introduced showed nothing more than a
verdict of guilty by a jury. There had been no entry of judgment
-onthe verdicts, nor any passing of sentence.
The court held it
to be reversible error to admit in evidence the record of the trial
of another as principal charged with the actual killing showing
that such other had been found guilty of murder in the first degree, where such record did not show that judgment had been entered or sentence passed.
The facts in the case at bar state: "It was shown that Sanderson was tried and found guilty of the murder of X, and was
sentenced to be electrocuted. Evidence was offered of this convic-
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tion by the record." Are we to presume that such record did not include the sentence passed upon the principal? There is nothing
to indicate that the sentence was "shown" in any other manner than
by the record offered. To presume that such was the case would
be to read into the statement of facts a phrase which would materially alter them. The court cannot read "between the lines."
The only natural conclusion that can be reached is that the record offered of Sanderson's trial was a complete one, citing not only
the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury, but the passage of sentence by the court in accordance with that verdict. Under such
circumstances the record was admissible for the purpose for which
it was offered, and the conviction of the defendant, Rettew, must
stand.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Rettew was strictly, a principal in the second degree, rather
than an accessory before the fact. While presence at the commission of the crime is said to characterize a principal, even of
the second degree, it is said by Russell, Crimes, Vol. 1, p. 50,
"the presence need not be a strict, actual immediate presence." It
may be a "constructive presence." If two concert a crime, one to
do the criminal act, the other to watch at proper distance to prevent a sdrprise, or to favor an escape of the one who is to do the
act, they are, says Russell, "in the eye of the law present at it" (the
crime). "Where several join to commit a crime, and one keeps
watch while the others commit the crime, the one who watches is
responsible as a principal in the second degree." 121 Cyc. 187.
"Rettew was to keep watch and give an alarm should any officer
appear" while Sanderson, his confederate, was effecting a burglarious entrance into a house, and was in it for the purpose of stealing.
It does not appear that the presence of the owner, X, in the
building, was expected or considered as likely or possible. Rettew
intended to aid the committing of the burgarly and the theft. Did
he intend to aid the commission of a murder? It does not appear that he did. We must assume, then, that he did not. He
intended to aid a burglary and a theft.
Says Wharton, Crim. Law (10 Edition) p. 238, "It is not necessary that the crime should be part of the original design; it is
enough if it be one of the incidental probable consequences of the
execution of that design, and should appear at the moment to one
of the participants to be expedient for the common purpose. Thus,
where A and B go out for the purpose of robbing C, and A, in
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pursuance of the plan, and in furtherance of the robbery, kills C,
B is guilty of the murder."
The indictment charged Rettew with being an accessory before
the fact. The guilt of the principal must be proved in order to convict him of this accessoryship. It can be proved prima facie, by a
record of the conviction and sentence of the principal. There
was no evidence in contradiction of the guilt of the principal.
The indictment charged Rettew with being an accessory. He
was, strictly, a principal of the second degree. We regard the variance between the facts proved and the description of the relation
to them of Rettew as that of an accessory, as immaterial.
Judgment affirmed.
ADDISON v. COAL CO.
Trebpass-Diverse Ownership of Strata of Land-Right of Access;
by the Owners of Underlying Strata
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Addison owning a tract of land containing a bed of coal granted
the coal to defendant with a right of access to it from the surface.
Below the coal were deposits of oil. Addison undertook to dig a
well through the coal of defendant in order to reach and remove oil.
The mining operations of defendant reached the point where the
well was and defendant obstructed and destroyed it. This is trespass.
Dunn, for plaintiff.
Gorson, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JOHNSON, J. The only question presented in this case is
whether the plaintiff had a right to dig the well through the defendant's coal which he had previously leased, in order to get at
the oil underlying the coal. The court maintains that he has. When
plaintiff leased underlying strata to defendant he did not lease minerals in its broader sense as applying to all the resources and
rough products of nature under the ground but only the coal, so
defendant had no claim upon the oil as is hinted at in the defendant
counsel's brief. This disposes of the ownership of the oil. An
estate in coal is determinable upon the removal of the coal and
when all coal is removed the space it occupied reverts back to the
grantor by operation of law. Grant of an estate in coal does not
carry with it any interest in strata underlying coal.
It has always been the policy of the Pennsylvania courts to
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allow mines to be dug and wells to be sunk for the manufacturing
and producing of nature's raw materials. In a concurring opinion
in the ease of Charters Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, in
refusing to grant an injunction to prevent defendant from sinking
an oil well through plaintiff's coal, the learned court states that the
ownership of coal is subject to an easement of the owner of the surface to bore through for oil or gas. In 25 L. R. A. 225, a note
states that the Supreme court of Pennsylvania has decided that the
right to drill oil and gas wells through the stratum of coal belonging to owner of surface, is a right which exists at all times
though it must be exercised so as to do no violence to the right of
the owner of the soil.
There has been no claim in this case that the plaintiff injured
defendant's land in any way whatever by sinking his shaft and he
complied absolutely with the requirements of the note above stated.
Any claim of injury would be prima facie repelled by the fact that
the defendant was able to drill so close to well that he struck the
piping of the well and until that time it is not shown that there
was any leakage anywhere so as to injure the mining operationr
of the defendant or that the oil oozed up through the coal.
In Pennsylvania Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250
Pa. 300, plaintiff had sunk a well to supply brewery with water
through the land underneath the surface, which land contained
coal. The land had been granted to defendant. The well was sunk
and sufficiently encased and defendant in his mining operations
broke open the pipe. The court said that the plaintiff was entirely
within his legal right in putting down well and maintaining pipe
through which water was passed.
While defendant had right to
remove coal from around pipe, it had no right to interfere in any
way with well or pipe. The case at bar is directly under the rule
set down in the case just referred to.
Defendant alleges that he had only to use ordinary care in removing the coal and plaintiff does not allege that he acted negligently.
Specific proof of negligence is unnecessary. The breaking of the pipe after the knowledge that it was there is prima
facie evidence of negligence and it is for the defendant to rebut
that presumption. Fischer v. Ruch, 17 Sup. 240.
In light of the foregoing we award the decision to plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Judgment affirmed.
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BUHL v. KLEPPER
Voluntary Conveyance of Land-Effect as to Existing Creditors-Statute of 13 Elizabeth
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Klepper owned real property worth $10,000, and $20,000
worth of bonds. He conveyed one piece of land worth $2,000 to his
wife gratuitously, but without fraudulent intent. Buhl, a creditor,
obtained judgment against him for $3,700, and -preferring to look
to Klepper's land rather than to his personal property, caused an
execution to issue and he levied on the land conveyed to Mrs. Klepper. A sheriff's sale took place, and Buhl became the purchaser,
paying $2,200. This is ejectment against Mrs. Klepper.
Heskett for plaintiff.
Luria for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
McCARTHY, J. Whether or not the plaintiff will he successful in this action depends upon what effect the voluntary conveyance had upon the property of the grantor, Mr. Klepper, in respect to an -existing creditor. True, the statute of 1 Elizabeth
which provides that "every conveyance of land which delays, hinders, or defrauds creditors shall be as against such creditors utterly void," is law in Pennsylvania. Clark v. Douglas, 62 Pa. 408.
But, we think, the element of intent must be present before this
statute is operative. The facts in this case clearly state that there
was no fraudulent intent.
When we consider the assets of the grantor along with consideration received for the parcel of land voluntarily conveyed, the
absence of intent is apparent. He didn't denude himself of all
his property, nor a large part of it. He merely conveyed a small
portion of it, retaining more than enough to satisfy the claim
against him. And when he did this, he did all that can be reasonably expected of him; because a man must not be entirely restricted. The above argument seems to be in accordance with
the prevailing rule.
Indeed, our own court in Mates v. Young. 251 Pa. 193, a case
apparently identical, held that "where judgment creditors of a husband bring an action of ejectment against his wife for certain real
estate which he had conveyed to her in alleged fraud of creditors,
a finding of the trial judge that the conveyance was for a valuable
consideration and even if voluntary, would not have been fraudulent, as the grantor had retained sufficient property with which
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to pay his then existing indebtedness, will not be iet aside."
In the light of the above case, the conveyance must stand, and
judgment be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The statute of 13 Elizabeth, which was merely declaratory of
the common law and is a part of the common law of Pennsglvania
does not expressly declare that voluntary conveyances shall be
void as to creditors. It declares merely that conveyances made
"with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors * * * shall be
void."
It has been held, however, that a conveyance made with no
actual intent to defraud, may nevertheless violate the provisions
of the statute if the conveyance is voluntary. There are decisions
to the effect that a voluntary conveyance is, as to existing creditors, per se fraudulent without regard to the grantor's intent or
to the amount and value of the property retained by him, but according to the great weight of authority, including that of the
Pennsylvania courts, if it appears that the grantor retained property amply sufficient to pay his debts a conveyance is not invalid
under the statute merely because it is voluntary'. 14 Am. & Eng.
Eneyc. 303; 20 Cyc. 512; Chambers v. Spencer, 5 Watts 404; 8 P.
& L. Dig. Dec. 12630.
Judgment affirmed.
BUSHONG v. F. BANK
Forgery-Right of Forger to Recover Funds Deposited in Bank to
His Own Account
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A was a depositor in defendant's bank. On July 7, 1915, his account showed a balance of $600. B without A's authority drew a
check for $750, on the bank, in the name of A. Bushong was also a
depositor in the bank. The check was endorsed by its payee who
presented it for payment. The bank, not knowing the payee, asked
Bushong who identified him and for this purpose endorsed the check.
Two days afterwards, the bank discovered that A's name to the
check was a forgery, and it charged the amount of it against the
account of Bushong, subsequently declining to pay the money deposited by him on his check. He sues the bank for the deposit.
Coleman, for plaintiff.
Fisher, for defendant,
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OPINION OF THE COURT
BURD>, J. It was a well settled principle of common law, thar a
bank, when it received money on deposit, agreed that such money
should be paid out only on the order of its depositer; hence when it
paid a forged check it was held to have paid it out of its own funds
and could not therefore charge its depositer with the amount so
paid out, and as against him the bank must stand the loss, provided
the depositor had been free from all blame and had not contributed
to the forgery by his negligence. But this has been changed by
the act of 1849, and further by the act of 1901, which provideb that
"an accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument
without receiving value therefor, for the purpose of lending his
name to some other person." Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time
of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party. In this case at bar, the depositor did not contribute to the forgery
or to the loss of the money by his negligence, but he wilfully and
fraudulently forged the check, with intent to defraud, the person
whose name he forged. So in light of this fact, since the right of a
bank to recover from a forger, or from those to whom it may have
paid the check bearing the forged signature of one of its depositors,
or a forged indorsement, the only remedy available to the defendant
bank was the remedy adopted by them. Again, in a suit brought
by a depositor against a bank to recover the amount which it may
have improperly paid on a forgery, the issue is a forgery. This isue ought to be complicated with the other, and it seems that the
only logical and reasonable rule is the one adopted in McNeelr v.
Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588, which provides that "the bank
can recover from a forger responsible for the nonpayment or from
those who, by their indorsement of a check have vouched for previous indorsement or the genuineness of the signature of the alleged
drawer." A contrary decision would be putting a premium upon
the laches of a depositor, and give to a dishonest one the opportunity to help a forger to escape.
We think that since a "check is a bill of exchange drawn on a
bank payable on demand," Neg. Inst. Act 1901, that the question
is wholly covered by the Acts April 27, 1909, P. L. 260,
April 5, 1849 P. L. 424, and the Act of 1901. Section 10, of the Act of
April 5, 1849, provides that where payments have been made upon
forged negotiable instruments, the amount of such payments may be
recovered back from the persons previously negotiating such instruments. This was not repealed by See. 1377 of the Negotiable In-
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struments Act as amended of 1909, there being nothing in the latter Act inconsistent with the Act of 1849. Sec. 4 provides also that,
when a check remitted to a bank for collection has been credited
to a depositor in cash, it may be charged back against the depositor
in case it turns out to be a forgery.
The facts of this case seem to revolve about the concrete question. Did the Act of 1901, repeal the Act of 1849? in short whether
a bank is now bound to know the signature o: its depositors, as it
In
was at common law; and before the Act of 1849.
Colonial Trust Co. v. National Bank of Western Penna.,
50 Super. 510, Judge Head declared that Sec. 62, which
provides the acceptor, by accepting the instrument, engages that
he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance, and admits the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature,
and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument, did not
repeal the Act of 1849, which sets out the following principles of
law "That whenever any value or amount shall be received .....
other instrument negotiable
.or
in payment of any check .....
within this Commonwealth by the holder thereof, from the endorsee
or endorseev or payer or payee of the same and the signature
of any person or persons represented to be parties thereon
and such value or amount by reason thereof erroneously given or
paid, such endorsee or endorsees, as well as such payer or payee, respectively shall be legally entitled to recover back from the person or
persons previously holding or negotiating the same the value or
amount so as aforesaid given 'or paid by such endorsee or endorsees
-or payee or payees, respectively to such person or persons." This is
duly substantiated by the case of Blairsville National Bank v.
Crabbs, 44 Super. 454, whirh holds that "one who advances the
full amount of a check, becomes entitled to a lien upon that paper
for the full amount advanced and under this act must be deemed
a holder for value"
In absence of a prejudicial negligence, the general principle is
that when a check left for collection has been credited to a depositor
in cash, it may be charged back to him in case it is a forgery.
Michie on Banks and Banking, vol. 2, page 1500. And in Pennsylvania, we have held that, if the forgery is not discovered until
after the amounts of the check has been paid by the drawee bank to
the collecting person, the latter may return the money and charge
the amount against the funds of the depositor. Rupp v. National
Security Bank, 136 Pa. 146.,In event of no funds in the hands of the
person to which to charge the amount which has been paid on the

Dickinson Law Review
forged instrument, the person to whom the money was paid becomes
a debtor to the paying bank, and the bank may forthwith recover
against him, ,on the theory of a debt due; and under Commercial
National Bank v. Hemminger, 105 Pa. 496, 501, 502, in absence of
a special agreement to the contrary, a debt due to a bank can alwaye
be set off against the deposits of the plaintiff which are in the hands
of the bank.
The question of due diligence on the part of the bank, as well
as morals and ethics, does not enter into this case in the least and
the plaintiff does not have a defense behind them for "It is never
a defense to an action by principal for money for the plaintiff or
defendant to show that in equity and good conscience the money
belonged to him." And we feel constrained to render a verdict for
the defendant, as, "The right of a bank to recover from a forger, or
from those whom it may have paid the check, bearing the forged
signature of one of its depositors, or a forged indorsement, is its
only remedy for the fraud practiced upon the forgery. McNeily
v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588, is authority for the doctrine stated and we need not elaborate the point further.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below, relying upon the tenth section of the
Act of April 5, 1849, felt constrained to render a judgment for the
defendant.
In so rendering judgment the court erred.
The Act of 1849,
gives the bank the right to recover back "from the person * * *
previously holding or negotiating the same (the forged check) the
value or amount so as aforesaid paid * * * to such person." This
act gives the bank the right to recover the amount paid on a forged
check only from the person to whom payment was made.
The
reason is that the word such as used in the statute qualifies or
relates not only to a person who previously held but also to one who
has been paid.
In this case payment was made to the payee and not to Bushong. Both of these qualifications apply only to the payee and
not to Bushong. See Judge v. Trust Co., 25 D. R. 679.
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LINDSAY v. RAILWAY COMPANY
Negligent Sounding of Gong-Concurring Causes-Fright of Horse
Snyder for plaintiff.
Todd for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHEEDY, J. Lindsey was driving a horse and buggy along a
street when a fire cracker was discharged by a boy which excited
and alarmed the horse. While Lindsey was endeavoring to restrain the horse, a car of the defendant's came along. The motorman had a full view of the horse and could have seen that it was
alarmed. He, nevertheless, clanged the gong continuously and
loudly, whereupon the horse became wildly terrified and, turning
around suddenly, overturned the buggy, inflicting serious injury
on Lindsey, besides destroying the buggy and injuring the horse.
$1000.00 would be a fair compensation for his injury, and $400.00
for that to the horse and buggy. The defendant contends: (1)
there is no liability unless the horse would have done what he
did if the primary fright from the fire cracker had not occurred.
(2) It is per se negligence to drive a horse down a street of a
borough which can be frightened by the sound of a gong; (3) It
is the duty of the motorman,. often, to sound the gong; an excess
of clanging cannot be imputed as negligence. (4) The alarm of
the horse was not the progimate effect of the clanging.
This is an action of trespass for injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, his horse and buggy.
The defendant has four contentions upon which he bases his
case.
We will first dispose of the second and third contentions of the
defendant and then later take up the discussion of the first and
fourth together as they are the most important contentions and, at
the same time, they are practically synonymous, i. e. they may be
discussed under one heading.
The defendant in his second contention, claims that it is per se
negligence to drive a horse which may be frightened by the sound
of a gong, down a thoroughfare. The defendant seems to erroneously assume the fact that the horse was of a vicious and unruly
temperment, but the facts of the case at bar seem to be barren of
any grounds upon which to base such an assumption. In North
Manheim Township v. Clara Arnold, 119 Pa. 380, the Court held that
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it could not be presumed that, in absence of proof to the contrary,
the frightened horse was a vicious animal or that it was not roadworthy and well broken. And, in Gibbon's v. The Railway Company, 155 Pa. 279, the learned court held that "It is not contributory negligence as a matter of law for a person to drive on a street
occupied by an electric railway, even though the cars cause or make
noises calculated to frighten or unnerve horses."
In considering the third contention of the defendant, it seems
to be very well settled in Pennsylvania by a quite recent case of
the Supreme Court of said State that "While it is unquestionably
the duty of a motorman to ring his gong with emphasis upon
proper occasions, it may be negligent to ring it violently and unnecessarily in proximity to a frightened horse whose condition is
manifest. Ordinary prudence should be exercised by the motorman
under such circumstances." Lapesly v. Pittsburg R. Co., 243 Pa.
167. And it is clearly evident in the present case that the motorman
did not exercise ordinary prudence under the circumstances for the
facts of the case clearly propound that "the motorman had full view
of the horse and could have seen that it was alarmed."
Before discussing the first and fourth contentions of the defendant it would be well to take a cursory observation of the law
of "proximate cause" as the doctrine of it will have much to do
in the decision of this case.
Proximate cause is not to be determined by time or distance,
but by the succession of events; the question is whether there are
any intermediate causes, disconnected from the primary fault and
self-operating, which produced the injury; if there were not, the
act of negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of all
the consequences resulting therefrom. "In determining what the
proximate cause is, the true rule is that the injury must be the
natural and probable consequence of the negligence; such a consequence as, under the surrounding circumstances of the case, might
and ought to have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as likely to flow
from his act." Hoag v. the Railway Co., 35 Pa. 293; The Railway
Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353; Township of Mahoney v. Watson, 112 Pa.
578.
In the case of Marshall v. The Lehigh Railroad Cov 240 Pa.
272, the facts seem to be quite similar to the case at bar. In an
action against the Railway Company to recover damages from
injuries resulting from the fright of a horse, the case is for the
jury where the evidence for the plaintiff tends to show that while
driving a buggy near the railroad tracks of the defendant Company, his horse became frightened at steam escaping from an en-

Dickinson Law Review
gine not operated by the defendant but by an individual contractor;
that plaintiff had quieted his horse when he again became frightened at the approach of a hand-car of the defendants' over a
public crossway; that the men on the hand-car, although warned
by the plaintiff, failed to stop or even slacken speed, as a result of
which the horse ran away and caused the injuries for which the
suit is brought. In such a case, whether the proximate cause of
the accident was the escaping steam or the negligent operation of
the hand-car was a question of fact for the jury. One point which
might confuse the normal mind and lead one to believe that the
above cited case is dissimilar to the case at bar is that in the case
of Marshall v. Lehigh R. Co., 240 Pa. 272, the facts state that the
horse again became quieted after becoming frightened at the escaping steam; while in the present case it does not state specifically
that the horse had resumed quietude after the boy had fired the
cracker, yet it does not say that he was still frightened; that the
plaintiff had the horse under control, although it was somewhat
nervous.
Therefore, in view of the orthodox trend of modern decisions
and in respect to all common reasoning and good sense, we charge
the jury to find for the plaintiff for the amount demanded.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Lindsay's horse underwent two excitements, that caused by
the fire crackers and that caused by the loud clanging of the gong.
Possibly, had the first not occurred, the second would not have
produced the intense emotion that led to overturning of the buggy.
The second alarm was fused into the first alarm, and the compound mental result, generated the acts that caused the damage. The first contention of the defendant is that if the horse
would not have acted as he did, in consequence of the clanging
of the gong, had he not been already excited by the cracker, the
defendant is not responsble. The learned court below has properly
refused sanction of this position. Causes are never unitary. There
are always two or more co-operating. A death results to X, who
is shot by A, which would not have resulted, had he been in good
health at the time, or had the physician who attended him been
more skilful or careful. A is not excused from the guilt of homicide. The fact that the gong would not have seriously scared the
plaintiff's horse, had he not been already agitated by the fire
cracker, is not inconsistent with the defendant's causation of the
final terror of the horse and of the overturning of the vehicle.
It is not per se negligence to drive a horse down a borough
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street, because it is affrightable by the sound of a gong. Gongs
may be sounded in different ways; more or less violently, or frequently.
While it may be often the duty of the motorman to sound a
gong, there may be times when it is his duty not to sound it, or to
sound it less frequently and noisily. He must take note of the
changing circumstances, in determining whether to clang or not, or
with what loudness to do so. It does not follow from the duty
sometimes or often to sound the gong, that a particular clanging,
at any particular time, can be negligent.
The court was asked to say that the alarm of the horse was
not the proximate effect of the clanging. Certain sights, sounds
or odors, may kindle terror in a horse. The terror acts on the muscles of the horse, whether with or without his volition, thus producing muscular motions large and sudden enough to overturn the
buggy. The terror is the direct effect of the sounding; the overturning movement is the direct effect of the terror. The intervening of a state of mind between the initial and the terminal act,
does not make a causative chain so long as to preclude responsibility for the initial act. There are many cases reported, in which
the defendant has been held liable for acts which wrought injury
to the plaintiff through the alarm of horses or other animals. Marshall v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 240 Pa. 272; Lapsley v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 243 Pa. 167.
Judgment affirmed.

DAVIS v. MALONE
Negotiable Instrument -

Presumption that Holder is Bona Fide

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Malone made a note, payable to Horrock and Anderson or to
either of them. The payees endorsed the note to Davis. The consideration of the note has wholly failed, but the trial court has refused to allow Malone to prove this. Verdict for Davis. Motion
for a new trial.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BALOUGH, J. The note upon which plaintiff sued in thig case
was given by defendant and was regular and complete upon its face
and the defendant has not offered to establish the contrary.
The points offered by Malone are supported by the following
cases: McChesney v. Gurnsey, 61 Super. 490; Howie v. Lewis, 14
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Super. 232; Loeb v. Mellinger, 12 Super. 592; Real Estate Co. v.
Russel, 148 Pa. 496. They are irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent
for the following reasons: Section 59 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act:-Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a
holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any
person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden
is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he
claims acquired the title as holder in due course.
Section 55 of the same act:-The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this act
when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by
fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for
an illegal consideration, or when he negotiated it in breach of
faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud. Defendant not having offered to prove any defect in plaintiff's title to the
note the evidence offered could not overcome plaintiff's prima facie
position as a holder in due course.
Section 59 of the Act of 1901 is quoted by the counsel for the
defense as the law expressed upon this subject. Sec. 59 of the act
mentioned above is as follows: Every holder is deemed, prima facie
to be a holder in due course, but when it is shown that the title of
any person who has negotiated the instrument was -defective, the
burden is on the holder to prove that he acquired the title as a holder
in due course.
It is the opinion of this court that the Act (of May 1901, Section
59), does not constitute a defense.
To render the title defective
within the meaning of the act, the person who negotiated it must
have obtained the instrument "by fraud, duress, or force and fear,
or other unlawful means, or for any illegal consideration or when
he negotiates it in breach of faith or under such circumstances as
to amount to a fraud." Section 55, Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 202.
There was nothing contained in the offer of the defense from
which it might be inferred or concluded that the title to this note in
suit was "defective." And, upon the failure of the defendant to
offer or produce such evidence as would have required the plaintiff
to have produced other proof, we see no error in a verdict for the
plaintiff. Schultheis v. Sellers, 223 Pa. 513; Second National Bank
of Pittsburgh v. Hoffman, 229 Pa. 429. Therefore we discharge the
motion for a new trial.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The note on which this suit is founded, is payable to "Horrock
and Anderson or to either of them." At common law, a note payable to one or the other of several persons was not negotiable, be-
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cause it was payable to one only on the contingency that it was not
paid to the other. Norton, Bills and Notes 86.
The Negotiable Instrument Act however preserves negotiability
though the instrument is payable to "one or some of several payees." Norton, supra; 8 Corpus Juris, 177. The note before us is
payable to Horrock or Anderson. It is negotiable.
Failure of consideration is no defense, as against a bona fide
endorsee for value.
The holder will be presumed to be such,
until proved not to be. Proof of the failure of consideration, does
not cast the burden on the plaintiff of proving that he is a bona
fide holder for value. The 59th section of the Neg. Inst. Act,
says, "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder
in due course (who, by the 57th section holds the instrument "free from any defect of title of prior parties," and free from
defenses available to prior parties among themselves)." When the
title of the payee is defective, that is, according to section 55, when
he obtained the instrument by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or
other unlawful means or for an illegal consideration, the proof of
this defect puts on the endorsee the duty of showing that he is a
purchaser for value without notice.
The defense attempted here is not the existence of any of these
facts but a failure of consideration. The burden then is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder for
value.
Judgment affirmed.
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IMPROVING THE LAWYERS
An effort to improve, intellectually or morally, any class of
men must win a certain sympathy. The lawyer class is numerous, and beyond all other classes, of the same numerical size, influential. Indeed, the hypertrophy of its influence is one of the
sinister facts of our time. It is out of all proportion to the character, or the intelligence of the members of the profession.
It is a suspicious circumstance that the lawyers are aiming
in the name of better training, to induce the courts to demand
qualifications for candidates for the bar, insistence on which means
a serious reduction of the number of admissions. If grocers or dry
goods merchants in a town, could say on what conditions other
grocers or merchants should enter into rivalry with them, we
might be sure that the increase in the number of their competitors
would be infinitesimal. Lawyers are not a whit more disinterested than pursuers of other businesses. Their apparent zeal for
higher education may be suspected.
The standards insisted on, and in a measure extorted from the
courts, are such as, had they been applied when the actual judges
of the Supreme or the Superior Courts were admitted to the bar,
would have excluded from it two-thirds of their number.
There is an effort among the college graduate section of the
bar to make college graduation a preliminary to the study and
practice of law. Two-thirds of the existing judges of the state,
would, had this criterion been adopted, when they sought admission to the bar, have been harshly excluded.
The greater part of the work of a lawyer can be well perGood
formed by men of very moderate ability and learning.
natural endowments and an unsophisticated moral character, with
reasonable industry, will equip a man to adequately discharge ninetenths of all the duties of the lawyer. It seems foolish to insist
that every lawyer should have the acumen, skill and learning necessary to do the other tenth. The expert lawyer, like the expert
surgeon or phsicyian, must always be resorted to in critical cases.
The men who have superior education and talent, will, as
preachers, doctors, teachers, lawyers, get the most important work
to do, and win the highest emoluments and influences. But it is
a wasteful policy that would strive to compel every member of an
extensive profession to have any very high minimum of aptitude
and expertness.

